Adjusted EBITDA up 80%, and they still refused to take a single analyst question.
Thesis: D2C has a genuine Pricing Power Signal: price up, subs up 3.7M to 71.2M, OIBDA +44%, FCF +$750M swing. That engine is not the problem. The problem is that total company advertising growth of 17% included a 22-point Super Bowl contribution, meaning core ads declined, and Q2 comps against Super Bowl 58 with no answers coming because management took no questions. You cannot size a position around an interim three-CEO structure that sold the India business and printed 11.5M Class B shares while calling it deleveraging.
Verdict: AVOID — Conviction: MEDIUM
Catalyst: Management commits to returning 'in short order' with a long-term strategic plan across three pillars: hit content, balance sheet, streaming optimization. Viacom 18 sale closes end of 2024 or early 2025 for ~$500M after-tax proceeds against 4.3x leverage.
Key Risk: Q2 year-over-year advertising comp against Super Bowl 58 with core ads already declining, arriving exactly as post-strike content trough hits a subscriber base that just absorbed a full domestic price increase.
The Tell: CFO volunteered, unprompted: 'Domestic ARPU was negatively impacted by lower-than-expected engagement due to the lagging effect of last year's strikes.' Management volunteered a demand-side miss in the same breath as the ARPU win, then took no questions on it.
Friction Level: MODERATE_FRICTION — Both sides agree the D2C engine is real (ARPU +26%, subs to 71.2M, OIBDA +44%). Disagreement is whether Super Bowl-inflated ads, a post-strike content trough, and a 4.3x balance sheet run by a three-person Office of the CEO make the setup unsizeable.
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